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pril  will  be  an  important month  in  the  EU's  enlargement  agenda, particularly  as 
regards the Balkan countries. In accordance with the December European Council 
conclusions, the European Commission is expected to present three reports to the 
member states for consideration, one relating to Kosovo and the other two relating to Serbia 
and Macedonia. 
It  is  on  the  basis  of  the  content  of  these  reports  that  the  European  Council  in  June  will 
consider the next steps in moving the enlargement process forward. The reports relating to 
Serbia and Macedonia will be particularly important in this respect as they will enable the 
Council to determine whether enough progress has been made for it to decide on setting a 
date for opening accession negotiations with both countries.  
The report on Kosovo will enable the Council to determine whether the time is right to open 
negotiations for a stabilisation and association agreement (SAA), the first important step on 
the albeit long road to EU integration. This will be a joint report from both the Commission 
and the High Representative Catherine Ashton. The latter will focus on the ongoing dialogue 
between  Pristina  and  Belgrade,  a  process  which,  as  stated  in  the  December  Council 
conclusions ''should gradually result in the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and 
Serbia  with  the  prospect  of  both  being  able  to  fully  exercise  their  rights  and  fulfil  their 
responsibilities''.  The  Commission's  contribution  meanwhile  will  focus  on  the  reform 
process. In particular, it will assess the extent to which Kosovo will have met the short-term 
priorities set out in the Commission's progress report of last October concerning the rule of 
law,  public  administration,  protection  of  minorities  and  trade.  Within  those  priorities, 
member states will pay special attention to the fight against organised crime and corruption 
and will need to be convinced that enough is being done in this respect. 
A  positive  assessment  overall  would  enable  the  Commission  to  propose  negotiating 
directives for an SAA for adoption by the Council. This would represent a major boost for 
Kosovo’s efforts towards EU integration. And with the accelerating pace of the dialogue 
between Pristina and Belgrade, the likelihood of a favourable decision by the Council for 
Serbia would augur well for an equally positive decision for Kosovo. 
A2 | ERWAN FOUÉRÉ  
 
As with Kosovo, the report to be presented to the Council in relation to Serbia, which was 
granted candidate status in March of last year, will be a joint one from both the Commission 
and the High Representative Catherine Ashton. The Commission's contribution will focus on 
the  reforms  following  on  the  recommendations  contained  in  the  Commission's  progress 
report of last October. It will have convincing arguments which will point to the determined 
efforts by the Serbian government in promoting reforms, not least in the areas of judicial 
reform, anti-corruption, anti-discrimination and protection of minorities. Serbia is fortunate 
to have a strong public administration, which will be a valuable asset in the EU accession 
process. 
However the main focus of attention for the EU member states will be the assessment from 
the High Representative on the improvement of relations with Kosovo. This will be the key 
priority  for  the  Council  to  determine  whether  accession  negotiations  with  Serbia  should 
commence.  The  personal  engagement  of  High  Representative  Ashton  in  the  dialogue 
between  Belgrade  and  Pristina  is  a  welcome  development.  While  it  would  be  wrong  to 
minimise  the  difficulties,  the  fact  that  the  dialogue  has  already  brought  together  the 
presidents and the prime ministers from both sides respectively on not just one but several 
occasions is a positive signal of willingness to move forward. All indications suggest that the 
desire  on  both  sides  to  find  pragmatic  solutions  to  the  outstanding  issues,  such  as  the 
devolution  of  powers  to  the  Serb  communities  particularly  in  northern  Kosovo,  will  be 
confirmed at the next round of talks (of which eight are now foreseen) between both prime 
ministers on April 2nd, even if neither side for the moment wishes to concede on issues of 
status. The association of local authorities in Macedonia, which played a major role following 
the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement,1 could offer a useful precedent in overcoming ethnic 
tensions  by  bringing  together  in  one  body  municipal  authorities  from  different  ethnic 
compositions working for common objectives of economic and social development. 
Another positive factor which will help the Council determine its position relates to Serbia’s 
recent  efforts  to  renew  its  active  contribution  towards  regional  cooperation  as  well  as 
improving relations with its neighbours such as Croatia, whose prime minister visited Serbia 
recently. These developments are seen as further evidence of Serbia’s ambition to move to 
the next stage of the EU accession process without delay. 
Sadly the same cannot be said for Macedonia, which is facing a dramatic political situation. 
The forcible ejection of not only all the journalists but also of the opposition MPs from the 
parliamentary assembly chamber on December 24th was a tragic reminder of the continued 
failure of the Gruevski-led government to engage in any meaningful political dialogue over 
the past years. It was the opposition’s efforts to remove what it perceived as unproductive 
expenditure (related in large part to the controversial Skopje 2014 project) from the budget 
that  prompted  the  dramatic  events.  While  the  opposition  parties  are  not  blameless,  the 
government nevertheless made no attempt to repair the damage or even to stretch out a 
hand  of  reconciliation.  Instead  in  early  February,  it  pushed  through  a  change  in  the 
parliamentary  rules  of  procedure  to  limit  debate,  despite  the  absence  of  the  opposition 
parties which continued to boycott parliament following their forced eviction. 
These latest developments, and the unwillingness of the government to promote a spirit of 
compromise, have led to further erosion of basic democratic values and standards in the 
country,  as  well  as  deepening  of  the  mistrust  in  an  already-deeply  divided  society.  The 
recent  violent  inter-ethnic  clashes  in  the  streets  of  the  capital  city  (between  the  ethnic 
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Albanian community comprising over 25% of the population and the majority Macedonian 
community) have added to the heightened degree of malaise, while the government's refusal 
to entertain any criticism of its handling of the situation has exacerbated the climate of fear 
and self-censorship. 
This is particularly the case with regard to the government’s attitude towards the media 
which has warranted frequent rebukes from the OSCE representative for the freedom of the 
media as well as from every international media watchdog. According to the latest world 
media freedom index, published in January by ''reporters without borders'', Macedonia was 
ranked in 116th place out of 179 countries, a drop of 22 places from 2012, and over 70 places 
from 2009, when it was ranked in 34th place. (The comparable rankings for Serbia are 65th in 
2009  and  63rd  in  2013).  The  messages  from  the  EU  are  invariably  distorted  by  the 
government-controlled media outlets, while the few independent journalists who persevere 
are subject to continued intimidation and harassment. This in itself is a shocking indictment 
of the current government in Macedonia. 
With the danger of seeing the country's aspiration to join the EU being derailed completely, 
Commissioner  Štefan  Füle,  accompanied  by  the  European  Parliament  rapporteur  for 
Macedonia, Mr Howitt, and the former European Parliament President Mr Buzek, undertook 
an eleventh-hour mediation effort on March 1st. (The presence of Mr. Buzek, a senior and 
respected member of the European Peoples Party to which Gruevski's party is affiliated, in 
addition  to  Mr  Howitt,  a  member  of  the  group of  the  Progressive  Alliance  of  Socialists  and 
Democrats, was no doubt aimed at putting additional pressure on both the governing party 
and the opposition.) 
The agreement reached after many hours of painful discussions has offered a temporary 
reprieve. It provides for the opposition to end its boycott and participate in the local elections 
in return for a commitment from the government to launch talks with the opposition after 
the local elections for the purpose of determining a date for holding early parliamentary 
election. The latter was one of the main opposition demands (the last elections took place in 
2011). The agreement reached also provides for a debate about the state of democracy in the 
country, as well as the setting up of a commission of enquiry into the December 24th events. 
Past experience however would tend to suggest that after the local elections have passed, it 
will take very little for this shaky compromise to come unravelled. 
As for the local elections themselves, the first round took place last Sunday (March 24th) in a 
relatively  calm  atmosphere,  after  a  campaign  which  was  marred  by  intimidation  and 
frequent irregularities mainly committed by the VMRO-DPMNE governing party abusing its 
control  over  the  media  and  over  the  public  administration.  The  OSCE/ODIHR  electoral 
observation report issued on March 25th refers to ''credible allegations of intimidation and 
misuse  of  state  resources  throughout  the  campaign''.  The second  round  is scheduled  for 
April  7th,  although  the  lack  of  a  level  playing  field  raises  serious  questions  as  to  the 
legitimacy of the overall outcome. 
Ironically  it  is  the  name  dispute  with  Greece  that  has  drawn  the  most  attention  in 
Macedonia’s EU accession debate, and has provided a convenient scapegoat for the current 
government in diverting attention from the serious internal political situation and lack of 
willingness to engage in any political dialogue.  
It is unfortunate that the Commission's 2012 progress report made only passing reference to 
the  need  for  enhanced  political  dialogue.  Yet  in  previous  years,  for  example  in  the  2009 
progress  report  which  included  a  recommendation  that  a  date  be  set  for  opening 
negotiations, or in the report of 2010, the issue of political dialogue was given much greater 
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illustrate, the lack of dialogue within the political and institutional system remains a major 
issue in the country. In this respect, Commissioner Füle's statement on February 15th calling 
on  the  political  leaders  to  ''take  responsibility  and  find  a  solution,  demonstrating  the 
maturity of the democratic institutions and putting the best interests of the country and its 
citizens first” is to be welcomed, although it would have had greater impact had it been 
made several months ago. The high-level accession dialogue, established a year ago, which 
helped to focus the minds of the government on the critical reforms, represents, as the recent 
report from the European Affairs Committee of the UK House of Lords2 highlighted, only a 
short-term incentive, which is clearly not enough in the current political environment in the 
country. 
Probably the only way to keep the EU aspirations of the country on track and to prevent it 
from sinking into further political instability would be for the accession negotiations to start 
without delay. The intrusive nature of the accession process would ensure better control over 
the government's errant behaviour, a more consistent performance in meeting the accession 
criteria  and  a  more  effective  way  of  signalling  to  the  government  that  its  deep-rooted 
nationalist agenda is incompatible with its EU aspirations, let alone fulfilling the aspirations 
of its citizens for a more stable future. Greece should be persuaded that political stability in 
its nearest neighbourhood would better serve its own interests. Allowing negotiations to 
start  would  also  be  an  appropriate  way  of  marking  the  10th  anniversary  of  the  2003 
Thessaloniki summit, which set out a blueprint for EU accession for the Balkan region. 
This is a critical time for the EU’s enlargement agenda with competing interests at play – 
between those who suggest that further enlargement is a heavy burden that the EU can ill-
afford in the current economic climate, and others who continue to believe that extending the 
frontiers of peace and security to include the Balkan countries will make the EU a safer place.  
To counter the naysayers, it will be important for the EU to show that its current strategy 
continues to deliver dividends, as it certainly does in the case of Kosovo and Serbia; it should 
also be ready to adapt its strategy where necessary, as in the case of Macedonia, by using 
whatever leverage it has in a more direct and consistent way and ensuring that its policy 
objectives and strategy in this area are based on the progress assessment narrative and not 
the other way around. It should rather use the glaring weaknesses in the reform processes as 
an argument to convince the member states that opening negotiations is the most effective 
way  to  ensure  stability  as  well  as  greater  control  over  the  country's  current  political 
leadership. As Commissioner Füle himself stated before the above-mentioned UK House of 
Lords Committee, a rigorous application of conditionality in the enlargement negotiations 
would help to restore public confidence in the enlargement process both within the member 
states as well as in candidate countries. 
                                                   
2  “The  Future  of  EU  Enlargement”,  Report  of  the  UK  House  of  Lord,  6  March  2013 
(www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf). 